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SYMposium ARTICLES
INDIA'S CORPORATE
GUIDELINES

2009:

GOVERNANCE

VOLUNTARY

RHETORIC OR REALITY?
Umakanth Varottif

In the aftermathofrecentepisodes (such as the accountingfraudat Satyam) that
have tested the efficacy ofcorporategovernancenorms in India,the Government
has adopted a cautious approachto reforms with a view to avoidinga knee-jerk
reaction. Change to existing norms has come forth in theform ofthe Corporate
GovernanceVoluntary Guidelines,2009 [hereinafter"the Guidelines"],a set of
good practices that may be voluntarily adopted by Companies. This article
examines, primarilyon two counts, the responseof the Governmentofindia to
governance scandals throughthe issue of the Guidelines.First,it evaluates the
substantiveprovisions ofthe Guidelinesandfinds that while the Guidelines do
contributeto enhancement ofthe existing corporategovernanceframework in
significantways, theyfail to satisfactorilyaddress some of the shortcomings in
the prevailingregime that have surfaced in the recentpast. Second, it seeks to
determine the efficacy ofthe "voluntary" approachfollowedby the Government
of India (whereby companies are encouraged to follow a code of corporate
governance on a recommendatorybasis) ratherthan throughthe imposition of
mandatory rules. Based on a comparison of the voluntary and mandatory
approachesto corporategovernanceand an analysis ofvariousfactors atplay in
India, it raisesdoubts about the success of the voluntary approachin India.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2009 turned out to be eventful for corporate governance in India. It
was ushered in with the admission of a mammoth fraud by the chairman of
Satyam Computers,' which was in turn preceded by an attempt (albeit foiled) by
the company to engage in certain related party transactions by embarking upon
unrelated businesses.2 The event has often drawn parallels with the fraud at

2

Letter from B. Ramalinga Raju, Chairman, Satyam Computer Services Ltd., to the
Board of Directors, Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (Jan. 7, 2009), available at http:/
/www.hindu.com/nic/satyam-chairman-statement.pdf. See also Heather Timmons
and Bettina Wassener, Satyam Chief Admits Huge Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/business/worldbusiness/
08satyam.html.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of Satyam Computer Services
Ltd., 2 (Dec. 16, 2008, at Hyderabad, India), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/
resources/documents/satyam0115.pdf. See also R. Narayanaswamy, L'affaire
Satyam, HINDU Bus. LINE, Dec. 28, 2008, available at http://
www.thcindubusinessline.com/2008/12/20/stories/2008122050010800.htm.
2
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Enron.3 The year also witnessed another episode involving independent directors
of Nagarjuna Finance, who were charged with a criminal offence under a state
legislation due to the company's failure to repay depositors, thereby invoking
consternation within the independent director community.4 These events have
generated a great deal of debate regarding the state of corporate governance in
India, with calls being made for an overhaul of the governance system.5 They
have also prompted recommendations by business and professional associations
for reforms.' For several months following the Satyam and Nagarjuna episodes,

See Pratip Kar, Enron? Parmalat? Lehman? No, no, it's Satyam, Bus. STD., Jan. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/pratip-kar-enronparmalat-lehman-no-no-its-satyam/18/46/345625/; Salil Tripathi, India Faces an 'Enron
Moment', WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123146282814566519.html. It is necessary to note, however, that the similarities exist
only at a superficial level. The details reveal a number of differences between the
Enron cohort of scandals and the Satyam episode. For an analysis of the differences,
see Vikramaditya Khanna, CorporateGovernance in India:Past,Presentand Future?, 1 JINDAL
GLOB. L.R. 171, 188-89 (2009) [hereinafter "Khanna, Past, Present and Future?"].
Shyamal Majumdar, Gunning for Kampani, Bus. STD., Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://
www.business-standard.com/india/news/shyamal-majumdar-gunning-forkampani/346758/; Sucheta Dalal, Scared Speechless, MONEY LIFE, Apr. 9, 2009, available
at http://www.suchetadalal.com/?id=ab5beOld-cb0l-7c5d-49c9ca36506c&base=
sections&f&t=SCARED+SPEECHLESS. Following the events at Satyam and
Nagarjuna Finance, independent directors began resigning from companies in
droves. See Abha Bakaya, Independent Directorson QuittingSpree, ECON. TIMES, Apr. 20,

2009, available at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-company/corporate-trends/
Independent-directors-on-quitting-spree/articleshow/4422477.cms; Ranju Sarkar,

Why Independent Directors are Quitting in Droves, Bus. STD., May 14, 2009, available at
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/why-independent-directorsquittingin-droves/16/54/356245/;Candice Mak, CorporateStructuresareFrighteningIndependent
Directors, ASIA L., Apr. 9, 2009, available at http://www.asialaw.com/Article/2178283/
Corporate-structures-are-frightening-independent-directors.html.
See, e.g., Khanna, Past, Present and Future?, supra note 3; Vikramaditya Khanna &

Shaun J.Mathew, The Role oflndependent Directorsin ControlledFirms in India:Preliminary
Interview Evidence, 22(1) NAT. L. SCH. IND. R. 35 (2010); Afra Afsharipour, The Promise
and Challenges of India's Corporate Governance Reforms, 1 IND. J. L. EcON. (2010,
forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640249 [hereinafter

6

"Afsharipour, Promise and Challenges"]; Umakanth Varottil, A Cautionary Tale of the
Transplant Effect on Indian Corporate Governance, 21 NAT. L. SCH. IND. R. 1 (2009);
UmakanthVarottil, Evolution and Effectiveness ofIndependent Directorsin IndianCorporate
Governance,6 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 281(2010) [hereinafter "Varottil, IndependentDirectors"].
Prominent among these recommendations for reform are: (i) MINISTRY OF CORPORATE
AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE CII TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, availableat
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/DraftReport NareshChandra_.CII.pdf;
(ii) THE INSTITUTE OF COMPANY SECRETARIES OF INDIA, ICSI RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK, available at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/
latestnews/ICSI_Recommendations Book 8dec2009.pdf; and (iii) NASSCOM,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT, available at http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/
templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=59073.
3
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there appeared to be no concerted response forthcoming from Indian regulators
regarding the course to be adopted to reform corporate governance norms.
However, in December 2009, regulatory action did occur, and a significant step
was taken when the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India
[hereinafter "MCA"] promulgated the Corporate Governance Voluntary
Guidelines 2009 [hereinafter "the Guidelines"] .'
The Guidelines set out a number of measures with a view to enhancing
corporate governance standards in India. These include streamlining the process
of appointment of independent directors, clarifying their roles and responsibilities
and fixing appropriate remuneration for them, reforming the audit process by
crystallizing the roles of the audit committee and the auditors, and certain
incidental matters such as secretarial audit and the institution of a mechanism
for whistle blowing. A distinctive feature of this set of reforms is that there has
been a deliberate attempt to avoid any knee-jerk reaction so as to steer clear of the
fall-outs of emergency legislation that is often enacted in the wake of a crisis. The
regulators not only bided time before they proposed reforms, but those reforms
were introduced on a "voluntary" or "recommendatory" basis rather than through
mandatory legislation.' This approach resembles the Combined Code followed in
the U.K.9 and contrasts with that followed by the U.S. Congress through mandatory
legislation in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 enacted in the wake of
Enron, WorldCom and other similar corporate governance failures in the U.S."o
7

8

9

10

The Guidelines can be accessed at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/
CG VoluntaryGuidelines 2009 24dec2009.pdf. They constitute the outcome of
consultations conducted by the National Foundation for Corporate Governance
as well as some of the recommendations of the business and professional
associations; Id.
Guidelines, Preamble (stating that they "provide for a set of good practices which
may be voluntarily adopted by the public companies. Private companies,
particularly the bigger ones, may also like to adopt these guidelines").
For example, the Guidelines adopt the "comply-or-explain" approach, where they
state: While it is expected that more and more corporates should make sincere
efforts to consider adoption of these guidelines, there may be genuine reasons for
some companies in not being able to adopt them completely. In such a case it is
expected that such companies should inform their shareholders about the
guidelines which the companies have not been able to apply either fully or partially.
R. Bandhopadhyay, Secretary, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Preface to the
Guidelines, supra note 7.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been the subject matter of academic criticism due to
its excessive regulation coming in the wake of corporate frauds. See, e.g., Roberta

Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
L.J. 1521 (2005); Larry E. Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud:A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002).

YALE

4
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This article examines, primarily on two counts, the response of the
Government of India to governance scandals through the issue of the Guidelines.
First, it evaluates the substantive provisions of the Guidelines and finds that
while the Guidelines do contribute to enhancement of the existing corporate
governance framework in significant ways, they fail to satisfactorily address
some of the shortcomings in the prevailing regime that have surfaced in the
recent past. Second, it seeks to determine the efficacy of the "voluntary" approach
followed by the Government of India (whereby companies are encouraged to
follow a code of corporate governance on a recommendatory basis) rather than
through the imposition of mandatory rules. Based on a comparison of the
voluntary and mandatory approaches to corporate governance and an analysis
of various factors at play in India, it raises doubts about the success of the
voluntary approach in India.

II.

EVALUATING THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

At the outset, it is essential to consider the framework within which the

Guidelines fit." Broadly, corporate governance norms in India consist of the
Companies Act, 1956 (and the various rules promulgated under the Act) as well
as the listing agreement that public listed companies enter into with stock
exchanges on which their securities are listed [hereinafter "Listing Agreement"].
The key provision in the listing agreement that enumerates the norms pertaining
to corporate governance is Clause 49 of that agreement [hereinafter "Clause 49"].
While the Companies Act is an enactment of Parliament whose administration
falls within the domain of the MCA, the format of the Listing Agreement is
prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India [hereinafter "SEBI"],
India's securities market regulator.
Neither the Companies Act nor Clause 49 has undergone any substantive
amendments following the recent corporate governance crisis in India. While the
Companies Act is in the process of being amended by way of the Companies Bill,
2009,12 the proposed amendments are in the same form as those contained in its
2

12

It is not necessary, however, for the purposes of this Article to examine the
evolution of the corporate governance norms in India until the onset of the recent
governance failures. For a recent succinct discussion of the evolution of the norms
from a broader perspective, see Khanna, Past, Present and Future?, supra note 5;
Afsharipour, Promise and Challenges, supra note 5.
The Bill is presently pending in Parliament. See Chakshu Roy & Avinash Celestine,
Legislative Brief: The Companies Bill, 2009, PRS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (Aug. 18, 2009),
available at http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Company/Legislative%
20Brief -companies%20bill%202009.pdf.
5
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previous version, the Companies Bill, 2008. In other words, the Companies Bill
has not yet been specifically amended to incorporate lessons from the crises of
2009. As for the Listing Agreement, in September 2009, the SEBI Committee on
Disclosure and Accounting Standards (SCODA) issued a discussion paper that,
amongst other things, considered proposals for (i) appointment of the chief
financial officer (CFO) by the audit committee after assessing the qualifications,
experience and background of the candidate, (ii) rotation of audit partners every
five years, (iii) voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS), (iv) interim disclosure of balance sheets (audited figures of major heads)
on a half-yearly basis, and (v) streamlining of timelines for submission of various
financial statements by listed entities as required under the Listing Agreement.1 3
While certain proposals such as the appointment of the CFO by the audit
committee and other matters relating to financial disclosures have been
implemented by way of amendment to the Listing Agreement,14 other substantive
proposals such as rotation of audit partners are yet to be implemented.
Given this state of affairs, the Guidelines seek to build upon the existing
framework and to impose incremental changes to the corporate framework in
India, albeit on a recommendatory basis.' 5 To that extent, the specific provisions
of the Guidelines have to be viewed in the light of the Companies Act and, more
importantly, Clause 49. The provisions can be broadly categorized as follows: (i)
board structure and directorship matters; (ii) audit matters; and (iii) other
incidental matters.

A. BoardStructureand DirectorshipMatters
1. Board Appointments
The Guidelines introduce a greater element of formality to the appointment
of directors. The company is required to execute a letter of appointment with

13

SEBI Committee on Disclosures and Accounting Standards, Discussion Paper on
Proposals Relating to Amendments to the Listing Agreement (Sep. 2009), available at

14

15

http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/amendproposal.pdf.
These measures have been introduced through an amendment to the Listing
Agreement. See, Securities and Exchange Board of India, Circular No. CIR/CFD/
DIL/1/2010 (Apr. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2010/cfddilcir01.pdf.
It is also interesting to note that the Guidelines are intended to be adopted by all
companies, whether private, public or listed. To that extent, the ambit of these
guidelines is wider than Clause 49, which applies only to listed companies.
6
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each of the non-executive and independent directors that captures various details
such as the term of appointment, duties of directors, remuneration, D&O insurance
and list of prohibitions against directors. 6 The letter should form part of
disclosures to shareholders, so as to make the appointment process transparent.' 7
The Guidelines call for a separation of the roles of chairman and CEO so as to
ensure that unfettered decision-making powers are not vested in a single
individual.'" Limitations are also placed on the number of companies in which an
individual may become a director so as to ensure the availability of appropriate
time for directors to devote to the affairs of the company.19
2. Board Independence
Although the Guidelines do not significantly alter board structure, they
continue the prevailing trend of re-emphasizing board independence and
strengthening the role of independent directors. One of the significant drawbacks
of board independence in the Indian context has been the pervasive influence of
controlling shareholders (known as "promoters") in the nomination and
appointment of independent directors.2 0 In order to address this situation, the
Guidelines call for the establishment of a nomination committee comprising a
majority of independent directors, including its chairman, for evaluating and
recommending to the board appropriate candidates for directorship, with
transparency being key.21

16

1

's
'9
20

21

Guidelines, § I.A.1.i.
Guidelines, § I.A.1.ii.
Guidelines, § I.A.2.
Guidelines, § I.A.4.
Varottil, Independent Directors, supra note 5, at 314-17, 325-26. This is because neither
the Companies Act nor Clause 49 contains any specific procedure for nomination
and appointment of independent directors. They do not even require the
establishment of an independent nomination committee, an internationally
accepted practice for nomination and appointment of independent directors. As
for the international practice of establishing a nomination committee, see NYSE,
Listed Company Manual (2003), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/, I
303A.04; NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., Market Place Rules (2003), available at http://
nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=
chp_1_1 4_2&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F, r.
5605(e); Financial Reporting Council, The Combined Code on Corporate Governance
(June 2008), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/CORPORATE/COMBINEDCODE.

CFM, I A.4.1.
Guidelines, § I.A.3. The Guidelines also set forth some details regarding the manner
in which the nomination committee ought to carry out its affairs.

7
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(i) Efficacy of the Nomination Committee
While the nomination committee requirements have been introduced in
Indian corporate governance for the very first time by means of the Guidelines
and hence are noteworthy, it is doubtful whether they constitute giant strides
towards effective board nomination and appointment. An independent
nomination committee may be effective where shareholding in companies is
dispersed (such as in the U.S. and the U.K.) whereby it removes the director
nomination process outside the purview of management. However, as I have
argued elsewhere,' such a system may not achieve its intended goals where
shareholding in companies tends to be concentrated (such as in India). Although
a nomination committee may recommend candidates to begin with, the
election of such candidates is still subject to voting at shareholders' meetings
where controlling shareholders can wield significant influence. Due to this
reason, the nomination committee is likely to pick candidates who have the
tacit acceptance of the controlling shareholders so that the successful outcome
of election of such candidates is not in doubt. In that sense, although the
nomination committee system is superior to the existing model of director
nomination and elections, it does not abate the influence of controlling
shareholders in election of directors, particularly that of independent directors
(who are expected to be independent monitors of management as well as
controlling shareholders).
Arguably, the Guidelines provide cosmetic comfort, and a more radical
approach is warranted to deal with issues of independent director nomination
and appointment. There is a need for altering the process of election of independent
directors by increasing minority shareholder participation. This can be achieved
through processes such as (i) cumulative voting, and (ii) voting by a "majority of
the minority", in which the controlling shareholder is excluded from the voting
process. At the outset, these notions may appear somewhat outrageous, 23 but

22
23

Varottil, Independent Directors, supra note 5, at 352-53.
This is notably so because hardly any jurisdiction around the world requires election
of directors through cumulative voting as a mandatory matter, except for the
corporate law in Russia. REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAw: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 55 (2004). Although cumulative voting existed
widely in the past, several jurisdictions have gradually shied away from the
concept, and provide for it only as an enabling or optional matter for companies to
adopt. For a detailed discussion on aspects relating to cumulative voting, see Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 124(1994).

8
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proposals of this nature are beginning to gather a fair amount of steam, particularly
in the wake of recent episodes involving governance failures in controlled
companies.24
(ii)Defining Independence
Clause 49 defines the independence of a director with reference to the absence
of certain relationships with the company.25 One of the criticisms of this approach
is the lack of positive attributes of an independent director, due to which
companies may seek to appoint persons who satisfy the formal requirements of
independence, but who may not otherwise possess the requisite qualities to act
in a competent and impartial manner.26 Recognizing this drawback, the Guidelines
provide for certain positive attributes of independent directors such as "integrity,
experience and expertise, foresight, managerial qualities and the ability to read
and understand financial statements."2 Although these positive functional
attributes carry with them an element of subjectivity, they may nevertheless
forestall the appointment of mere figureheads (or, on occasion, even 'celebrity'
directors) on to corporate boards.
In order to ensure independence, a maximum tenure of six years has been
prescribed for independent directors. 28 Moreover, independent directors are to
certify their independence in writing at the time of appointment, and thereafter,
annually.29

24

25

See Khanna,Past, Presentand Future?,supra note 5, at 190; Varottil, Independent Directors,
supra note 5, at 353-63; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Guide on Fighting Abusive Related Party Transactions in Asia 42 (Sep. 2009),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/57/43626507.pdf; Asia-Pacific Office
of the CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity, Independent Non-Executive
Directors: A Search for True Independence in Asia 36-37, available at http://
www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2010.nl.1.
Clause 49 defines an independent director as a non-executive director who:
"apart from receiving director's remuneration, does not have any material
pecuniary relationships or transactions with the company, its promoters, its
directors, its senior management or its holding company, its subsidiaries and

associates which may affect independence of the director"

26
27
28
29

Listing Agreement, Clause 49(I)(A)(iii). In addition to the general statement above,
there are certain specific factors that help determine whether or not a director is
independent; Id.
Varottil, Independent Directors, supra note 5, at 313-14.

Guidelines, § I.B.1.i.
Guidelines, § I.B.2.1.
Guidelines, § I.B.1.ii.
9
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(iii) EnhancingIndependence
In order to enable boards to perform a greater monitoring role, the position
of independent directors is sought to be strengthened by the Guidelines.
Independent directors are provided the freedom to interact with company
management periodically" so as to obtain all relevant information necessary for
them to effectively perform their duties."' Greater emphasis is also placed on
appropriate training of directors.12 Additional rigour is introduced in the annual
evaluation of performance of the board and its directors on a more formal basis.3
All of these steps have been undertaken to impose greater responsibility on the
board in general and independent directors in particular to perform their
monitoring functions.
One of the perceived weaknesses in the existing system of independent
directors in India is the lack of clarity regarding their role." It is not clear whether
independent directors are to perform an advisory role or a monitoring role (by
overseeing management and controlling shareholders). It is also not clear whether
independent directors are to act in the interest of the shareholder body as a
whole or whether they are required to pay any specific attention to the interests
of the minority shareholders. The Guidelines appear to have addressed these
concerns, at least to some extent, by requiring that for every agenda item at the
board meeting, there has to be prepared an "Impact Analysis on Minority
Shareholders" which discusses any impact that the agenda item may have on the
rights of minority shareholders.3 Independent directors are required to discuss
and offer their comments on such impact analysis.3 6 Such measures are likely to
enhance the role of the independent directors in addressing the agency problems
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in a country like
India where shareholding in companies is largely concentrated.
3. Remuneration of Directors
The issue of remunerating directors (both executive and non-executive) has
been the subject matter of great debate lately in view of the global financial crisis.
§ I.B.3.i.

3o

Guidelines,

31
32

Guidelines, § I.B.3.ii.
Guidelines, § II.B.3.i.

33

Guidelines, §. II.D.

34
35

Varottil, Independent Directors,supra note 5; Khanna & Mathew, supra note 5.
Guidelines, § II.E.iii.

36

Id.
10
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Although remuneration of directors in Indian companies is comparatively on a

lower scale compared to the more developed countries, 37 there has been a steady
rise in remuneration for Indian executives and directors as well in recent times
such that it has engaged the attention of regulators.3 , It therefore receives fairly
extensive treatment within the Guidelines.
Under the Companies Act, senior management's pay is subject to
shareholders' approval and also to certain maximum limits in view of sections
30919 and 19840 of that Act. However, within these limits, there was hitherto no
guidance as to the manner in which the remuneration of directors was to be
fixed. The Guidelines seek to peg remuneration based on benchmarking the
performance of directors.41 There is a call for a balance between fixed pay and
incentive (or variable) pay.42 Non-executive directors (including independent
directors) are to be paid either a fixed contractual remuneration or an appropriate
percentage of the net profits of the company.43 Moreover, independent directors
are not allowed to be issued stock options or paid profit-based commissions so
that their independence is preserved.4 4 Finally, the Guidelines require the
establishment of a remuneration committee of boards, a majority of the members
of which should be non-executive with at least one being an independent director.45
The committee is to determine principles, criteria and basis of the remuneration
policy, all of which are to be disclosed to shareholders so as to make the process
entirely transparent.46
3

38

N. Balasubramanian et al., The Relation Between Firm-Level Corporate Governance and
Market Value: A Study of India (2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1586460.
See T.T. Rammohan, IndiaInc. Must Heed PM's Call, EcoN. TIMEs, May 31,2007, available
at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Opinion/Columnists/T-T-Ram-Mohan/
India-Inc-must-heed-PMs-call/articleshow/2088068.cms?curpg=2; B.S. Raghavan,

Curbing Runaway Executive Pay, HINDu Bus.
3

40

41
42

4

"

45

46

LINE,

Jun. 1, 2007, available at http://

www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/06/01/stories/2007060100860800.htm.
Section 198 stipulates the maximum amount of total managerial remuneration
payable by a company.
Section 309 stipulates the maximum amount payable to the directors of the
company.
Guidelines, § I.C.1.1.i.

Guidelines, § I.C.1.1.ii.
Guidelines, § I.C.1.2.i.
Guidelines, § I.C.1.4. Where stock options are granted to non-independent nonexecutive directors, they should be held by the concerned director until the end of
three years of exit from the board. Guidelines, § I.C.1.2.iv. This is to guard against
short-termism on the part of directors.
Guidelines, § I.C.2.i.
Guidelines, § I.C.2.iii.
11

Vol. 22(2)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2010

While the introduction of stringent measures governing the remuneration
of both executive and non-executive directors is welcome, the larger question of
whether such measures are necessary in the first place continues unanswered.
Primarily, a key aspect of management in Indian companies has been ignored in
this effort. In countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. where the issue of executive
and director remuneration is acute, directors and other senior managerial
personnel rely on remuneration received from the companies in the form of
salary and other perks. Apart from stock options or some shareholding (usually
as a result of exercise of options), the directors do not hold any significant stake
in their companies. Moderating director remuneration in such scenario carries
some logic to it. On the other hand, directors (particularly executive directors
and chief executive officers) in India in large measure take on a different
character. They are not merely employees of the company; they also control the
companies. A substantial part of corporate India, including public listed
companies, consists of family-owned businesses. In those cases, the executive
directors not only receive remuneration from the company in the form of salary,
but by virtue of shareholding and control, such directors may receive other
economic benefits in the company, such as dividend and appreciation in the
value of shares of the company. It is trite to believe in these circumstances that
the director is incentivized purely by the remuneration obtained from the
company; rather, it is the benefits of shareholding and control that operate as
key incentives.
Given this scenario, too much is being attributed in the Indian context of
a director being constrained in remuneration or other perks. Reduction in
such remuneration may, at some level, indicate a sense of austerity, but it may
mean less when seen in the overall context of the various commercial incentives
of an executive director in a family-owned business. In that sense, the debate
of director-pay seems misplaced to a large extent in the Indian corporate
context. It is perhaps a case of shadow-boxing. Of course, there may be a
handful of companies that are truly management-driven, or in the case of
Government-owned companies, where directors rely solely on remuneration
received in the form of salaries, but those appear to be more the exception
than the rule.
It may augur well for the Government instead to redirect its efforts to ensure
that the benefits of control are not abused in such companies so that minority
investors are protected (a matter I shall turn to shortly), thereby ensuring the
robustness of the capital markets.
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B. Audit Matters
1. Audit Committee
Clause 49 deals quite extensively with the constitution and functions of the
audit committee of the board. To that extent, the contribution of the Guidelines is at
best marginal. As far as the constitution of the audit committee is concerned, while
Clause 49 requires at least two-thirds of the members of the audit committee to
consist of independent directors,' the Guidelines require that independent directors
shall constitute only a majority,48 thereby raising questions as to whether the
Guidelines are in fact relaxing the bar for constitution of the audit committee.
The Guidelines provide enabling powers to the audit committee to access
further information regarding affairs of the company and also to obtain
professional advice from external sources in order to perform its role more
effectively.49 The audit committee has also been conferred greater roles and
responsibilities on areas such as monitoring the integrity of financial statements,
reviewing the company's internal controls and making recommendations in
relation to the external auditor.50
Under the regime contained in Clause 49, the audit committee has limited
powers with reference to related party transactions. Its role has essentially been
to ensure adequate disclosure of related party transactions. It has no approval
rights. This gives rise to an incongruous position whereby related party
transactions can go unchecked until they come up for periodical disclosures in
the financial statements of the company. The lack of safeguards against related
party transactions is even more troublesome given that such transactions could
potentially be used by controlling shareholders to extract value to the detriment
of the minority shareholders within the company. Such erosion of value to
minority shareholders arising out of related party transactions has been found
to be rampant in economies with a large number of controlled companies, with
India being one such example."' The proposal by Satyam to acquire two companies
4
4

4

so
51

Listing Agreement, Clause 49.II(A)(i).
Guidelines, § III.A.
Guidelines, § III.B.i.
Guidelines, § III.C.i.
Several academic studies have focused on the existence of phenomena such as
tunnelling and pyramiding among Indian business groups. See, e.g., Rajesh
Chakrabarti, Corporate Governance in India - Evolution and Challenges 1, 12 (2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=649857; M. Bertrand et al., Ferreting Out
Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups, 117(1) Q. J. EcoN. 121, 126 (2002).
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substantially owned by its promoters is anecdotal evidence of the extent to which
related party transactions can be used to erode minority shareholder value in

companies. 52
In this background, the imposition by the Guidelines of a requirement for
the audit committee to "monitor and approve all related party transactions
including any modification/amendment in any such transaction"" is a
substantial step in providing checks and balances against extraction of value

from the company by controllers and other insiders. It at least signals explicit
recognition of the fact that related party transactions ought to be approved by an

independent monitor (being the audit committee) in addition to mere disclosures
of such transactions.
On the other hand, the Guidelines arguably fall short of providing the desired

level of comfort to minority shareholders against value-reducing transactions
that may enrich controlling shareholders. For instance, related party transactions
ought to require the approval of a committee consisting entirely of independent
directors. However, by conferring approval rights on the audit committee, which
comprises both independent and non-independent directors, it is not certain
whether the same result will ensue. Apart from that, the Guidelines are silent
regarding the manner in which such approval for related party transactions is to
be granted (or refused). Another method often resorted to in approving related
party transactions is to have the same considered by a vote of minority
shareholders (i.e., wherein the controlling shareholder is excluded from the voting
process).54 The Guidelines, however, do not go down that path.55 In sum, while the
Guidelines do well to recognize the importance of approval of related party
transactions by a seemingly independent committee, they fail to capitalize on the
52

5
5

For a detailed discussion of Satyam's proposal and the consequences that ensued,
see, Varottil,Independent Directors,supra note 5, at 334-36.
Guidelines, § III.C.ii.
It has been recommended that such a method ought to be deployed under the
Indian corporate governance system as well. Asian Corporate Governance

Association, ACGA White Paper on Corporate Governance in India 26 (Jan. 19, 2010),

5

available at http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/ACGA India WhitePaperFinal
Jan19_2010.pdf.
Contrast this with the position in Delaware where section 144 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law provides for a safe-harbour that legitimizes self-dealing
transactions in certain circumstances: if (i) the board authorizes the transaction
through a majority of disinterested directors after being informed of the nature of
interest; or (ii) disinterested shareholders vote by a majority to authorize the
transaction after being informed of the nature of interest; or (iii) the transaction is
otherwise entirely fair as to the company.
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opportunity to establish adequate checks and balances that may prevent
extraction of value from minority shareholders through such transactions which
are found to be rampant in jurisdictions such as India which are dominated by
companies with controlling shareholders.
2. Auditors
Similar to the case of independent directors, one of the criticisms of the
existing mechanisms for appointment of auditors is that it is subject to capture
by the controlling shareholders. Hence, the Guidelines provide for the audit
committee to be the first point of reference for appointment of auditors." They
also call upon the audit committee to perform greater oversight in connection
with the functioning of the auditors."
Further, as in the case of independent directors, the auditors are required to
certify their independence to the company." In order to ensure continued
independence, the Guidelines provide for the audit partner to be rotated every
three years, and the audit firm to be rotated every five years." Additional
measures streamline the provision of information by the company to auditors
and also the establishment of a process for internal audit.60
Many of these changes arise out of the lessons learned from the Satyam
episode where the financial frauds went undetected by the auditors for a number
of years.61 However, in addition to the changes suggested in the Guidelines, this
episode has also revealed fragilities in the supervision of the audit community in
general. For instance, issues have been raised regarding the manner in which
audit firms are structured in India, the lack of proper regulation of auditors and
audit firms, and the inadequate enforcement of existing regulation.62 While the
56
5
5S

59
60

61

62

Guidelines, § IV.A.i.
Guidelines,§ IV.A.ii.
Guidelines, §lV.B.

Guidelines, § V.C.
Guidelines, § IV.D, E.
Payingthe Price:Satyam's AuditorsFace Plenty of Questions,INDIA KNOWLEDGE @WHARTON
(Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/
article.cfm?articleid=4346.
Shruti Srivastava, US Regulator Acts, But ICAI Yet to Move Against Satyam Auditors,
IND. ExPREss, Mar. 20, 2010, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/usregulator-acts-but-icai-yet-to-move-agai/593269/; Suman Layak & Puja Mehra,
Inside the Secret World of Auditing, Bus. TODAY, Feb. 5, 2009, available at http://
businesstoday.intoday.in/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=10032&
sectionid=22&issueid=49&Itemid=1.
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Guidelines do address matters relating to auditor independence, rotation and
like matters, they need to be supported by a suitable overhaul of the regulations
governing the audit profession."

C. OtherIncidentalMatters
Finally, the Guidelines introduce a few additional corporate governance
measures, some of which are novel in the Indian context while others are a
recalibration of existing requirements. Emphasis is placed on the introduction of
board systems that ensure compliance with laws, including by way of internal
controls.' Risk management too has acquired a prominent role as the board,
audit committee and executive management identify key risks and put in place
critical risk management framework." Internal compliance and risk management
are key elements of corporate governance that are being reinforced globally
following several governance failures witnessed during the global financial crisis,
and the Guidelines ensure that the governance reform in India is not left behind
on that count.
In order to ensure "transparent, ethical and responsible governance of the
company,"6 6 the Guidelines require companies to institute a mechanism for
secretarial audit to be conducted by a competent professional.67 Companies are
also required to establish an appropriate mechanism for whistle blowing, with
direct access being provided for whistle blowers to the chairperson of the audit
committee. 8

D. Overview of the Guidelines' Contribution
From a broader perspective, the Guidelines do contribute to the existing
corporate governance framework in significant ways. They do so by recognizing
the existence of agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders in the Indian context. Introduction of mechanisms such as
nomination committee for appointment of directors, approval of related party
63

64
65
66

A greater discussion of such supervisory regulation is not only outside the purview
of the Guidelines, but also that of this article. Nevertheless, the need for such
regulation (to support the reforms contained in the Guidelines) cannot be

understated.
Guidelines, § II.E.i.
Guidelines, § II.C.
Guidelines, § V.

67

Id.

68

Guidelines, § VI.
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transactions by the audit committee, and the impact analysis on minority
shareholders are examples of this approach. However, as we have seen, while the
Guidelines attempt to effectively address the interests of minority shareholders,
there continue to be shortcomings as to the manner in which they are sought to
be achieved. As argued earlier, the Guidelines stop short of complete treatment of
existing malaises as they do not provide for additional mechanisms such as
cumulative voting for election of independent directors or approval of related
party transactions by a committee consisting only of independent directors or
by independent shareholders, which may have brought the regime closer to fully
addressing problems of minority shareholders in controlled companies which
are largely prevalent in corporate India.
The Guidelines also give rise to certain redundancies. For example, several
aspects prescribed therein are those that are already contained in Clause 49 as
non-mandatory norms of corporate governance. These include matters such as
the appointment of a remuneration committee, training and evaluation for
directors and the establishment of a whistle blowing mechanism. The Guidelines
do not add anything substantial on these counts as they largely repeat matters
which were prescribed for voluntary compliance under the erstwhile governance
regime. The reason for such duplication is elusive.

III.

ASSESSING THE APPROACH FOR REFORM

Corporate governance norms have taken on certain set characteristics in
the Indian context. They were first introduced in a focused manner in 1998 through
the code for "Desirable Corporate Governance" under the aegis of the
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII).69 Curiously enough, they were introduced
as a voluntary matter to be adopted by companies. However, soon thereafter,
they acquired mandatory status through Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement, as
all companies (of a certain size) listed on stock exchanges were required to comply
with these norms."o Since then, Clause 49 has constituted the fulcrum of the
69

CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUSTRY, DESIRABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ACODE

(Apr. 1998),

available at http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/CIICode_1998.pdf [hereinafter"CII
70

Code"].
Securities and Exchange Board of India, SMDRP/POLICY/CIR-10/2000 dated Feb.
21, 2000, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2000/CIR102000.html.

While

initially the primary consequences of violation of the listing agreement was a
delisting of the company's shares from the stock exchanges, over a period of time

more significant consequences have been introduced for violation, such as a fine
of Rs. 25 crores. See Khanna, Past, Present and Future?, supra note 5, at 180-81;
Dhammika Dharmapala &Vikramaditya Khanna, CorporateGovernance,Enforcement,
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corporate governance efforts in India, spearheaded by SEBI.71 More recently,
however, there has been an effort to consolidate corporate governance norms (or
at least some of them) into the Companies Act, 1956. Towards that end, the
Companies Bill, 2009 does contain several aspects of corporate governance such
as independent directors and audit committee that have hitherto been the
mainstay of Clause 49.72 This represents a trend towards legislating on corporate
governance rather than leaving it to the domain of the Listing Agreement. It also
signifies the shift in corporate governance administration from SEBI, which
oversees the implementation of Clause 49, towards the MCA, which administers
the Companies Act.'
Within this background, the promulgation of the Guidelines by the MCA
sets two significant trends. First, although the corporate governance efforts have
been spearheaded by SEBI over the last decade, the more recent steps have been
taken by the MCA. For instance, apart from certain reforms pertaining to audit
matters, 4 SEBI has not taken any significant measures to reform corporate
governance in the aftermath of the recent governance scandals. On the contrary,
it is the MCA that has taken regulatory measures in the light of recommendations
received from industrial and professional associations.75 Second, although the
corporate governance efforts in India began on a voluntary basis, they acquired
andFirm Value: Evidencefrom India (2008), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105732.
It is however a different matter that the lack of enforcement seems to be one of

the weakest links in India's corporate governance framework. See Afsharipour,
Promiseand Challenges, supra note 5, at 31-33; Afra Afsharipour, CorporateGovernance
Convergence:Lessons from the Indian Experience, (2009) 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 335, 3887

72

91 [hereinafter "Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence"].
Over the last decade, Clause 49 has been subject to a number of amendments
that have consequently strengthened corporate governance norms in India from
time to time. The more substantive among the amendments have usually been
occasioned by recommendations of committees, such as the Narayana Murty
committee, appointed by SEBI.
The key provisions of the Companies Bill, 2009 relating to corporate governance
arise as a result of recommendations of committees appointed by the Central

Government, such as the Naresh Chandra committee and the J.J. Irani committee.
7

7
7

For a detailed discussion of the different, and sometimes inconsistent, approaches
of the MCA and SEBI towards corporate governance, see Afsharipour, Corporate

Governance Convergence, supra note 70, at 368-77.
These are discussed earlier, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
It is also noteworthy that the MCA also led the efforts specific to the revival of
Satyam, such as the steps to supersede the board with Government-appointed
directors, and to then bring about a sale of the company to another industry
player with a view to protecting the interests of shareholders, employees,
customers and other stakeholders.
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mandatory status, which was further reinforced by the introduction of stringent
penalties for violation of the norms. The Guidelines mark a reversal of approach
whereby there has been a preference to revert to the voluntary approach, as
opposed to a more mandatory approach that had become prevalent in the form
of Clause 49. In that sense, the corporate governance norms in India appear to
have completed a full cycle of having moved from the voluntary to the mandatory
and now back to the voluntary approach.
Apart from analyzing the substantive provisions of the Guidelines, it is
necessary to devote some discussion to alteration in the strategies followed by
India's regulators in addressing the problems faced on account of recent episodes
in corporate India. While the overlap of powers between the two regulators (MCA
and SEBI) to oversee corporate governance reforms in India and the various efforts
undertaken by each of them has been the subject-matter of debate,76 I propose to
devote attention in this Article to the strategy of resorting to a voluntary code of
conduct by deviating from the current emphasis on mandatory rules for corporate
governance. Before dealing with the specifics of such an approach in India, I discuss
the literature that examines the efficacy of a voluntary approach to corporate
governance in comparison with a mandatory approach.

A. ComparingVoluntary andMandatoryApproaches
In order to implement corporate governance norms, legal systems have
utilized two broad approaches. One relates to the use of a voluntary code of
corporate governance. Under this approach, either the government or an industry
body (self-regulator) may establish a code of conduct for companies. This is often
referred to as "soft law".? Although there is no compulsion to comply with such
a code, companies are required to make appropriate disclosures on whether they
comply with the code, or alternatively to explain the reasons for non-compliance.
The Combined Code in the UK is a classic example of such a voluntary "complyor-explain" approach.78 There may however be variations as to the manner in
76

"
7

See, e.g., Afsharipour, Promise and Challenges, supra note 5, at 30-32.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitationand
Regulation, 2 BERK. Bus. L.J. 167, 182 (2005).
Countries such as Australia and Canada too have also adopted voluntary codes.
Anita Indira Anand, An Analysis of Enabling vs. Mandatory Corporate Governance:
Structures Post-SarbanesOxley, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229, 229 (2006). Other jurisdictions
include Singapore and several European countries. For Singapore, see TAN LAY
HONG, TAN CHONG HUAT & LONG HSUEH CHING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES
INSINGAPORE (2006). For European jurisdictions, see Eddy Wymeersch, Enforcement of

Corporate Governance Codes (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=759364.
19

Vol. 22(2)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2010

which such codes are issued and overseen. In some cases, codes are issued by the
government or a regulatory authority, but they are not enforced or ever supervised
by any regulator.79 In this scenario, the role of engendering compliance is left
entirely to the market consisting of investors and other stakeholders. In other
cases, codes are issued by self-regulatory authorities who then supervise the
level of compliance by the companies that are subject to the code."o The listing
rules prescribed by the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Exchange are
examples of codes implemented by exchanges which are self-regulators. In this
scenario, it is in the interest of the self-regulator to ensure that all companies that
are subject to the code do in fact comply with it.
At the other end of the spectrum lies the mandatory approach whereby a
policymaker or regulator prescribes a set of rules that all companies covered by
them are required to comply. Companies do not have an option whatsoever to
avoid compliance, or even to explain non-compliance. This is a "one-size-fits-all"
approach. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S. is characteristic of such a mandatory
approach.
The voluntary approach has a number of advantages. First, it is not rigid
in its application. Companies may either comply or ignore the norms depending
on their nature, size and activity. In other words, where non-compliance is
justifiable, then companies are only required to explain reasons for that. Such
an approach takes into account the fact that all corporate governance norms
need not be uniformly applied to all companies."1 For instance, small companies
need not be foisted with the responsibility to comply with the entire range of
norms. Second, it provides sufficient flexibility.82 Corporate governance norms
are dynamic in nature, and may have to be modified from time to time. Their
existence in the nature of a voluntary code enables rapid modifications in order
to suit changing circumstances. Third, a voluntary code is expected to engender
greater compliance through a process of self-regulation.' It also makes the
7

Wymeersch, supra note 78, at 2.

80

Wymeersch, supra note 78, at 2.

81

Stilpon Nestor, Foreword to Simon C.W. Wong, Developing and Implementing Corporate
Governance Codes 1 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1321127.
Cary Coglianese et al., The Role of Government in CorporateGovernance, 1 N.Y.U. J. L.
&Bus. 219, 224 (2004); Cally Jordan, The Conundrum of CorporateGovernance,30 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 983, 1013 (2005).
Coglianese et al., supra note 82, at 224; Wymeersch, supra note 78, at 4.
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process less costly.' The government need not expend resources on enforcement.
The market, in the form of investors, will oversee compliance of such a voluntary
code by the companies that are subject to it."5 This is consistent with the efficient
capital markets hypothesis whereby investors would shun a company whose
governance practices do not meet expectations, which would then result in a
fall in the stock price of the company." Since such a fall in stock price would not
be in the interest of the management or the controlling shareholders, they
possess adequate incentives to ensure that the company complies with the
voluntary code.17 Furthermore, compliance may be motivated by other factors
that include the adoption of enhanced governance practices "in advance of legal
rules compelling them to do so"" or even "as a means to forestall more costly
mandatory regulation".89 As more and more companies, particularly the leaders,
begin to comply with voluntary codes, it may create a herding effect and cause
others to follow as well."
On the other hand, voluntary self-regulation has certain disadvantages,
due to which the importance of mandatory regulation cannot be ignored. First,
the inadequate sanctions under the voluntary system may encourage noncompliance." The system may even let egregious conduct pass through with

84
85

86

87

Anand, supra note 78, at 243-44.
Kai Li & Erinn B. Broshko, CorporateGovernance Requirements in Canadaand the United
States:A Legal and EmpiricalComparisonof the Principles-basedand Rules-based Approaches
4 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892708.
Annaleen Steeno, Note: Corporate Governance: Economic Analysis of a "Comply or
Explain" Approach, 11 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 386, 397 (2006).
Wymeersch, supra note 78, at 4. Investors are usually willing to pay a premium to

companies with enhanced governance practices. In addition, foreign investors
may be attracted to jurisdictions which impose high levels of governance. See

8
9

90
91

Anita Anand, Frank Milne & Lynette Purda, VoluntaryAdoption of CorporateGovernance
Mechanisms 8 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-921450.
Anand, supra note 78, at 235.
Anand, supra note 78, at 235; Professor Eisenberg also lists additional powers of soft law:
Among the sanctions that can give soft law force, despite its theoretically voluntary
nature, are private pressures, including moral pressures and shaming; the prospect
that courts will take account of soft-law standards in evaluating conduct; and
exclusion from the benefits of membership in, or the power to obtain benefits
from, an organization that makes soft law.

Eisenberg, supra note 77, at 182.
Anand, supra note 78, at 240.
Kerry Shannon Burke, Regulating CorporateGovernance Through the Market: Comparing
the Approaches of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, 27 J. CORP. L. 341,
355 (2002).
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impunity. Second, there are likely to be conflicts of interest among the market
players, including any industry self-regulator, due to which proper supervision
and enforcement of the code cannot be guaranteed.9 2 Third, there may be a tendency
on the part of companies to engage in a "check the box" approach by complying
with the form and not substance of the code. It may also encourage conduct by
which companies often shy away from complying the provisions of a voluntary
code by offering hackneyed or otherwise standardized explanations for noncompliance. 93 In such cases, there is a need for imposition of mandatory rules that
cannot be breached without appropriate consequences. 94 This will act as a
deterrent against errant companies.
Of course, both the voluntary approach and the mandatory approach have
advantages and drawbacks. Perhaps the ideal outcome would be to provide for
a combination of mandatory rules as well as a voluntary code of conduct that
may operate in conjunction. The mandatory rules may lay down the basic
minimum inviolable standards, while the voluntary code of conduct may build
upon the basic foundation in order to set out standards of good desirable conduct.
Yet, it is often difficult to drawn the line between mandatory rules and voluntary
codes and to achieve the appropriate balance. 9 5

B. Voluntary Approach: Evaluatingthe Evidence
There is a burgeoning body of literature that verifies the evidence regarding
the success (or otherwise) of voluntary codes of corporate governance. At a
conceptual level, it has been argued that an "enabling governance regime coupled
with mandatory disclosure of a firm's governance practices is likely to yield a
high level of compliance at lower direct costs to the issuer than a wholly mandatory
regime". 96 Although a mandatory regime will bring about higher levels of
compliance, an enabling approach coupled with mandatory disclosure is likely
to be effective on balance (based on a cost-benefit analysis).97 It has also been

92
9

Coglianese et al., supra note 82, at 225.
Companies may also hesitate to disclose freely for fear of rewarding their competition
with too much information about themselves. See Anand, supra note 78, at 237.

94
95

96
97

Burke, supra note 91, at 356.
Simon C.W. Wong, Developing and Implementing Corporate Governance Codes 5 (2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1321127.
Anand, supra note 78, at 229.

Anand, supra note 78, at 229.
22

India'sCorporateGovernance Voluntary Guidelines2009: Rhetoric or Reality?

argued that the high cost associated with mandatory rules naturally operates to
favour an enabling regime.98
Anecdotally, however, it is primarily in the U.K. that the voluntary
"comply-or-explain" approach can be regarded as having enjoyed some success.
A number of reasons have been proffered in support of this result. First, a
voluntary enabling approach is embedded in English legal tradition. Apart
from reliance on parliamentary conventions in lieu of a written constitution,
there is reliance on industry-based regulation through codes in other corporate
spheres, with the U.K. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers being a prime
example (in addition to the Combined Code on corporate governance)." Second,
the enabling regime governing the corporate sector through codes is the
brainchild of the institutional investor community that plays a significant role
in the U.K. corporate sector.100 Third, and as a consequence of the previous factor,
the institutional investor community performs a key oversight role by
monitoring the performance of companies within the parameters of the "complyor-explain" rule."o' Institutional investors have adequate incentives to scrutinize
disclosures by companies and then either raise questions with management, or
alternatively, sell-down their stakes in companies that do not inspire confidence,
thereby ensuring market regulation over companies. Fourth, market regulation
is also supported by a system of legal institutions with strong foundations, in
the form of company law, and more specifically fiduciary duties of directors
and the like.10 2
However, there is a pervading sense of agnosticism about replicating the
success of a voluntary code in the U.K. to other countries. For example, a voluntary
code will not be effective where there are no able monitors of compliance.1 0 In the
absence of an active institutional investor community in most jurisdictions
outside of the U.K. (and a few other developed economies), it is not prudent to rely
98

Such arguments are popular among academics who are critical of the SarbanesOxley Act in the U.S. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 10; Ribstein, supra note 10.
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Jordan, supra note 82, at 1011; Wong, supra note 95, at 8.

100

Over a period of time, protocols have been established on various matters thereby
making corporate behaviour somewhat predictable. See Wong, supra note 95, at 9.
Wong, supra note 95, at 10-11.
See Nestor, supra note 81, at 2.
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Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate

Concerningthe Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81
329 (2003).
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upon a market regulation mechanism for corporate governance that is based
purely on voluntary conduct of companies.'o Moreover, the influence of
institutional investors is compelling when shareholding in companies is diffused
(as experienced in outsider economies such as the U.K.). Yet, in economies where
controlling shareholders such as business families are dominant, it would be too
idealistic to rely upon the role of market regulation through institutional investors.
Transplanting voluntary codes of conduct to such economies would be
counterproductive." Consequently, it has been argued that codes are unlikely to
work in other jurisdictions as well as they do in the U.K. Such other jurisdictions
include not only those that are emerging economies or where shareholding in
companies is concentrated,"o6 but it has been argued that voluntary codes may act as
a mismatch even in the U.S. context.o' Lau, Nowland and Young discuss at length
the drawbacks of transplanting the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance
codes to family-owned companies that are dominant in the Asian economies. 0 s
The available empirical evidence is reflective of the aforesaid position,
although it is somewhat mixed regarding the outcome of the voluntary
approach even in the U.K. A study of 245 non-financial companies for the period
1998-2004 finds "an increasing trend of compliance with the Combined Code,
but a frequent use of standard explanations in case of non-compliance."" 9
004

"05
106
07

Wong, supra note 95, at 14, noting:
[g]iven the prevalence of controlling shareholders and the underdevelopment of
the asset management industry in most emerging markets, the pool of interested,
involved, and long-term oriented institutional investors resembling those found in
the U.K. is relatively small. Consequently, it may not be realistic to rely primarily
on institutional investors to enforce a governance code.
Wong, supra note 95, at 15.

Steeno, supra note 86, at 405; Jordan, supra note 82, at 984.
Jonas V. Anderson, Regulating Corporationsthe American Way: Why Exhaustive Rules

and Just Deserts are the Mainstay of U.S. CorporateGovernance, 57 DUKE L.J. 1081 (2008).
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Alex Lau, et al., In Search of Good Governancefor Asian Family Listed Companies:A Case
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Companies that did not comply with the code provided poor explanations,
which failed to identify specific circumstances that could justify noncompliance.110 Due to the monitoring and compliance issues, the market appears
to have been ignoring the effect of the "comply-or-explain" rule. Consequently,
companies tend to comply with the letter of the law rather than the spirit."'
Another study focuses in addition on the impact of voluntary codes on
companies with concentrated shareholding." 2 It finds that "the presence of a
majority shareholder or executive block holder is negatively associated with
voluntary adoption.""' This provides empirical support to the earlier discussion
that voluntary codes are unlikely to provide much succour in economies with
controlled companies, particularly where institutional investors are unlikely
to play a significant activist role.
C. Voluntary Code in India: Will It Work?
Based on a comparison of the voluntary and mandatory approaches to
corporate governance and on a review of on the available evidence (anecdotal
and empirical), there arises a nagging sense of circumspection regarding the
success of a voluntary approach in India. A number of factors are at play that
leads to such a result.
First,in terms of tradition and legal culture in India, there has been reliance
on government regulation of the corporate sector. Since independence, the Indian
industry has been subject to close regulation and supervision by the government
through mandatory regulation."' Although there has been some move towards
market regulation since liberalized policies were introduced in 1991, there is no
respite from the bite of mandatory regulation in the corporate sphere. If at all, the
movement has arguably been in the reverse direction in corporate governance.
For example, we have already seen that the governance norms that began as a
voluntary code acquired mandatory status soon thereafter and have continued
to be strengthened in terms of enforcement measures. The attitudes of the
government, regulators as well as the industry have been attuned towards such
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an approach, and any move to words a voluntary approach will require a
sweeping shift in mindset.
Second, the voluntary approach assumes the existence of a player in the
market who will monitor compliance or deviation, which would by itself ensure
proper adherence to the code by companies. As far as the Guidelines are concerned,
they do not impose any onus either on any governmental authority or on any
market player to monitor the efforts of companies in adherence to the code. In
that sense, the current approach appears to have left the code orphaned, thereby
belying any expectations of compliance. It is one thing to prescribe a code, but it
is another to establish measures to ensure its compliance. While the Guidelines
achieve the former, they leave the latter unattended.
Third, a voluntary corporate governance approach assumes the existence of
sophisticated market players such as institutional investors as we have seen in the
case of U.K. As far as India is concerned, although institutional investor activism is
on the rise, it is nowhere near the levels that have been witnessed in the U.K. that
establish the adequate level of confidence for a voluntary approach to work.
Fourth, the prevalence of concentrated shareholding among Indian
companies may very well act as an impediment to the successful implementation
of a voluntary code of conduct. Although there would certainly be a handful of
companies who would volunteer to maintain high levels of corporate
governance, it would be a difficult task to achieve overall implementation. The
presence of controlling shareholders would overshadow any efforts of
institutional investors to take on a market regulating activity to ensure
adherence to the Guidelines.
Fifth, the past track record of compliance in India does not justify the use of
a voluntary code. Although general standards of corporate governance have vastly
improved over the years,"' there are continued breaches of the basic requirements
of Clause 49. Moreover, a culture of stringent enforcement of corporate governance
norms is lacking in India. SEBI has hardly initiated any enforcement action for
breaches of Clause 49, and even when they have initiated actions, those have not
tended to be successful."' In the absence of success of enforcement of even
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mandatory norms, it is doubtful whether a voluntary code of conduct will be
capable of attracting greater compliance.
Finally, the Guidelines leave certain fundamental matters for voluntary
adoption by companies. These include nomination and election of directors and
treatment of related party transactions. They cannot be effectively implemented
unless they are included in mandatory rules. It is only the other aspects such as
training of directors, board evaluation and matters of practice and procedures
that can be left to a voluntary code of conduct. The act of combining the
fundamental aspects of governance with matters of practice, all within the
Guidelines, underplays the importance of significant requirements of corporate
governance in the Indian context, such as nomination of independent directors
without controlling shareholder influence and a proper approval process for
related party transactions.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Guidelines constitute an important step in development of corporate
governance norms in India, particularly because they come in the aftermath of
governance crises in 2009. While they address several shortcomings in the
erstwhile regime, they are also found to be inadequ ate on other counts, as detailed
in this article. The Government has adopted care and caution not to legislate
hastily in the wake of a crisis, but rather to introduce guidelines that may be
voluntarily adopted by industry. Whether or not a persuasive methodology to
enhance corporate governance norms in India will work remains to be seen, and
it is premature to empirically test the success (or lack thereof) of such an approach.
Nevertheless, given the track record of effectiveness of voluntary codes in other
countries, particularly those that are emerging economies with concentrated
shareholding, there is less reason to be optimistic regarding their success in India.
In terms of the way forward, it remains to be seen whether the Guidelines
will remain in their present form, or whether they will assume a more formal
and mandatory character. There are indications that the Government intends to
make the guidelines mandatory over the next year."' It is also possible that the
enhanced governance framework set out in the Guidelines will find its way into
the revised companies' legislation that is pending in Parliament in the form of the
Companies Bill, 2009. All of this indicates that the voluntary nature of the norms
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may well be a transitional arrangement, and the end-result would be the
establishment of mandatory rules. A determination of when and how these
changes may fructify is however like indulging in crystal ball gazing.
In sum, both mandatory and voluntary norms of corporate governance
have their benefits and costs. Their utility in a corporate governance system may
not be mutually exclusive either. The key is to find an optimal mix of mandatory
rules that are accompanied by a code of corporate governance standards. At the
same time, mere addition of rules and codes may not yield results. They key is to
engender greater compliance of codes or sterner enforcement of rules, both of
which continue to be far from desired levels in India.

28

